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INTRODUCTION 
While federalism justifies variations among state laws, federal criminal law 
is supposed to be a uniform national response to crimes of national import. On 
paper, a single set of federal criminal statutes and Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines applies uniformly throughout the United States. But in practice, 
federal criminal charges and sentences vary greatly from state to state and from 
district to district. For example, some districts regularly prosecute low-level 
drug offenders. Others set high drug-quantity thresholds for charging and refer 
less significant cases to state authorities. In some districts, defendants must go 
to great lengths to earn cooperation discounts at sentencing. In others, much 
less cooperation will suffice. 
Some of these variations reflect legitimate local responses to local crime 
patterns, needs, knowledge, and concerns. Other variations reflect local 
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hostility to national policy choices, methods, and values. The law must accord 
some weight to local needs, concerns, and limitations, while still ensuring 
horizontal equity and consistency with national policy. This problem 
exemplifies the enduring tensions between ex ante rules and ex post discretion, 
between equality and individualization, and between a synoptic bird’s-eye 
perspective and localized knowledge. 
Equal treatment of similar offenders in different places is one important 
value in sentencing, but not the only one. A range of variation is necessary, and 
indeed healthy, to adapt national policy to localities. While some types of 
variation are necessary and even desirable, others are not. Variation that is too 
great or too blatant comes at the steep price of inequality, unfairness, and 
reduced deterrence. 
Part I of this Article considers how regional and local sentencing patterns 
vary. Part I.A differentiates justified from unjustified variations. Justified 
variations are tactical responses to particular localized crime patterns, 
knowledge, and concerns. Variations are unjustified, however, when they 
reflect local hostility to national policy choices; arbitrariness; racial, ethnic, or 
class bias; or perhaps local implementation strategies at odds with national 
strategy. Part I.B considers how judges, head and line prosecutors, defense 
counsel, probation officers, and juries introduce local variations into sentencing 
patterns. 
Part II is a case study of an unjustified variation that has sprung from 
macro-level crime problems. Southwestern border districts use fast-track 
programs, offering massive charge and sentence discounts to dispose of 
thousands of immigration and drug crimes swiftly. Supporters praise fast-track 
programs as a traditional use of prosecutorial discretion to respond to unique 
local caseloads and to punish the worst offenders most harshly. But these 
programs introduce large and blatant inequalities, undercut national policy, 
cloak the need to reallocate enforcement priorities, and truncate procedural 
protections. In the PROTECT Act, Congress authorized fast-track policies but 
limited their sentencing departures, a troubling compromise that sanctioned 
inequality while regulating it. Congress should abolish or at least further restrict 
these programs. 
Part III moves onto a case study of justified and unjustified variations that 
stem from micro-level local practices: sentencing discounts for cooperating 
with law enforcement authorities under Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1. 
Part III.A explains how this provision works and how districts implement it in 
practice. Districts vary greatly in how many defendants receive so-called “5K1 
letters,” how large the defendants’ discounts are, how much cooperation it 
takes to win a letter, and why prosecutors offer discounts. Part III.B then 
considers the right blend of uniformity and local variation in this area. While 
line prosecutors have the best insight into their own cases and needs, 
procedural oversight and substantive guidelines on the acceptable forms of 
cooperation and the appropriate levels of sentencing discounts can improve 
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their decisions. In sum, national equality is a virtue, one that calls on us to 
minimize some but not all types of local variation. Prosecutorial discretion is a 
force for individualized justice, and inflexible rules can never take its place. 
Nevertheless, procedural and substantive regulation of charging, plea 
bargaining, and sentencing can check hostility to national policy while 
accommodating local problems and knowledge. 
I. TYPES, COSTS, AND SOURCES OF LOCAL VARIATION 
A. Justified and Unjustified Types of Local Variation 
Justified local variations have principled rationales that are not at odds with 
national policies. First, local crime problems, caseloads, and knowledge vary 
and require varied responses. A local crime problem, such as a sudden rash of 
shootings, may require a swift and severe response, such as a crackdown on 
illegal gun trafficking. Usually there is no time to seek legislation or increased 
enforcement funding. Agents and prosecutors must use their enforcement 
discretion to respond ad hoc to crises, and judges may cooperate by issuing 
stiffer sentences.1 Moreover, federal agents and prosecutors have local 
knowledge about how particular crimes are being committed. By targeting a 
particular money-laundering tactic, for example, agents may be able to bring 
down local drug rings that rely heavily on that tactic. Publicized targeting 
programs can also reassure the local populace that the crime du jour is under 
control, stemming crime waves and deterring copycat crimes. If the federal 
justice system responds to local enforcement needs, the result will be increased 
local respect and cooperation. If the system ignores pressing needs, federal law 
may lose local credibility and trust. 
Local variations that lack these justifications carry significant costs. Two 
identical defendants who violate the same federal law in the same way in 
different places deserve the same punishment. Imposing different punishments 
undercuts national uniformity and equality. Moreover, consistent enforcement 
sends clear, unequivocal messages to prospective criminals. Conversely, 
variations undercut deterrence and the law’s expressive message. This risk is 
especially great because criminal defendants tend to be overoptimistic and 
assume that they will receive sentences toward the lenient end of the spectrum.2 
Variations also make the law seem arbitrary, undercutting its perceived fairness 
and legitimacy. And once one locale carves out an exception to federal law, 
others may follow suit. 
Even when a local variation carries little immediate cost, it may reflect and 
 
1. See Vincent L. Broderick, Local Factors in Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 314, 
315-16 (1993); Reena Raggi, Local Concerns, Local Insights: Further Reasons for More 
Flexibility in Guideline Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 306, 306 (1993). 
2. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2498-2502 (2004). 
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reinforce troubling social values. Local variations may stem from or create 
racial, ethnic, or class disparities, as inner-city minorities may suffer heavier 
penalties than suburban whites who commit identical crimes. Indeed, concern 
about racial and ethnic disparities was one driving force behind the sentencing 
reform movement that culminated in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3 
Local independence can also be troubling when it creates variation simply 
out of hostility to national policy rather than out of bias or prejudice. Policy and 
value variations are appropriate among states because federalism respects state 
sovereignty, but this conclusion does not justify variation within the national 
government. Our democratically elected representatives have decided to enact 
uniform national criminal laws to address national problems and enforce them 
with one voice through one agency—the U.S. Department of Justice. Locales 
that disagree cannot in effect secede from federal criminal law any more than 
they can secede from the Union. While some locales dislike the War on Drugs, 
for example, they should neither disregard federal law nor water down 
enforcement, but instead should agitate for change through Congress. 
Otherwise, these locales send equivocal messages to potential criminals, 
undercutting the deterrence and denunciation of crimes across the country. 
The argument for uniformity is strongest for uniquely national crimes, such 
as immigration violations, and for crimes that in practice have to be prosecuted 
nationally, such as interstate drug rings. Both kinds of crimes typically have 
repercussions that extend far beyond a single district and do not simply displace 
state law and state policy choices.4 
A more debatable class of variations occurs when a locale insists that it 
knows best how to implement federal values locally. A local U.S. Attorney’s 
Office might claim, for example, that its high volume of cases requires a 
strategy of offering very lenient plea bargains. That office may achieve more 
deterrence if it plea bargains many cases swiftly for low sentences rather than 
holding out for average sentences in fewer cases. Because the argument for this 
low-price strategy rests not on local ends but on means, it is more justifiable 
than simple disagreement with national policy. However, this low-price 
approach is an implementation strategy, not a tactic, and strategy is a longer-
 
3. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold 
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 362-63 
(1991). 
4. This argument does, however, carry less weight where federal enforcement simply 
duplicates state enforcement. When that happens, a prosecutor or agent’s arbitrary decision 
to file a case federally preempts traditional state value choices. See generally United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-64 (1995) (striking down the Federal Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990 for exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and intruding into states’ 
traditional province of prescribing and enforcing local criminal law); Sara Sun Beale, Too 
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles To Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1000 & n.90 (1995) (describing then-U.S. Attorney 
Rudolph Giuliani’s Federal Day program, which prosecuted federally all drug dealers 
arrested by local police on one randomly chosen day each week). 
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term approach that is more amenable to national resolution. Moreover, because 
implementation strategies are visible, strategic disuniformity is likely to 
produce copycats in other districts and perceptions of inequity. A patchwork of 
varying implementation strategies also hides from Congress the longer-term 
issue of inadequate enforcement budgets and priorities, stifling national 
resolution of the underlying problem. 
In short, justified variation is grounded in tactical decisions about localized 
crime problems—particularly, transient crime waves. Unjustified variation, in 
contrast, stems from value disagreement; from legally irrelevant factors such as 
race, ethnicity, sex, and class; or perhaps from strategic choices, especially 
concerning enduring crime problems. 
How can Congress discourage unjustified variation while allowing justified 
variation to flourish? First, legislation could order the Sentencing Commission 
to monitor the problem. The Sentencing Commission could use its data to 
measure the different types of variation and how that variation affects charges, 
plea bargains, cooperation agreements, and sentence lengths. Variations that 
correlate closely with temporary, localized crime problems would be 
presumptively justifiable. Variations that are unrelated to local crime problems 
or that track legally irrelevant factors would be presumptively unwarranted. 
Qualitative surveys, as well as quantitative statistics, could ferret out evidence 
that variation stems from policy or value disagreement rather than local crime 
problems or knowledge. Second, congressional oversight committees could 
incorporate these data into their feedback loop, using them to investigate and 
reduce bad judicial and prosecutorial variations. 
B. Sources of Local Variation 
Many actors contribute to sentencing variations in the federal criminal 
justice system. Most obviously, judges sentence defendants differently. Local 
courthouse cultures, norms, and practices lead to local variations. In some 
districts, judges depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines range in two 
to three percent of cases; in others, the rate is ten or more times higher.5 Judges 
in the Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits are twelve or more 
times more likely to depart downward than judges in the Fifth Circuit.6 Circuits 
vary, in part because some circuits’ rulings give district judges greater freedom 
 
5. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 35 fig.4, 36 fig.5 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES], http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2005); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 53-55 tbl.26 [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK]. 
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE 
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 112 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN-
YEAR REPORT] (measuring judicial downward departures for mitigating circumstances, 
excluding fast-track and substantial assistance departures). 
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to depart than others circuits’ rulings and in part because of local traditions.7 
But even within the same circuit, district departure rates vary widely.8 In some 
districts, judges allow stipulated-sentence plea agreements to trump the 
Guidelines, while judges in other districts do not accept such agreements.9 
Districts also vary in how far their judges depart from the Guidelines.10 In 
addition, judges use different parts of the sentencing range to sentence 
defendants. Most routinely use the bottom of the range, but some use the entire 
range. This last phenomenon, however, explains only a tiny fraction of sentence 
variation.11 
Prosecutors also contribute significantly to local variations. Different U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices take different approaches to charging and declining cases. 
One district may charge defendants with possessing a few pounds of marijuana. 
In contrast, the Southern District of California routinely referred to state 
authorities or deferred federal prosecution of couriers caught with less than 125 
pounds of marijuana.12 Different offices also vary in dropping charges as part 
 
7. Compare Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 610-14 (1998) (describing the 
“tradition of independence” among Connecticut federal judges), with id. at 623-26 (stating 
that Massachusetts federal judges are more willing to follow the letter of the Guidelines, in 
part because “the First Circuit stringently interpreted and applied the Guidelines”). 
8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 112 (noting, 
among other examples, that the District of Montana’s downward-departure rate for 
mitigating circumstances is about one quarter of the Northern District of California’s rate, 
even though both are in the Ninth Circuit). 
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Compare, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 
88, 91-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.) (allowing the parties to use a stipulated-sentence 
plea agreement to trump the Guidelines because the bargain led to a fairer sentence than the 
Guidelines would have), with Probation Officers Advisory Group, Probation Officers 
Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 303, 305 (1996) (reporting that in 73% of 
districts, stipulated-sentence agreements are rare (occurring in 5% or fewer of cases), while 
in 7% of districts they occur in more than half of cases and in 11% of districts they occur in 
between one-quarter and one-half of cases), and id. at 307 app. A (reporting that in many 
circuits stipulated-sentence agreements are rare and that in the Fifth Circuit “[j]udges are 
hesitant to take such pleas”). 
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
in Four U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 
263-64 & tbl.1 (2005) (reporting that § 5K1.1 departures in some districts are typically much 
more generous than in others). 
11. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 102-03 (noting 
that placement within the Guidelines range explains less than one-sixtieth as much variation 
as substantial assistance departures and less than one-thirtieth as much as other downward 
departures); id. at 109-10 (noting that 880 of 911 federal judges typically sentence at the 
bottom of the range); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2005) (specifying that the top of each 
sentencing range shall be no more than six months or twenty-five percent above the bottom 
of the range, whichever is greater, except that if the minimum is thirty or more years, the 
maximum may be life). 
12. Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing 
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 293-95 
(1998). 
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of plea agreements, in agreeing to or not opposing downward departures, and in 
recommending sentences. For example, in some districts, prosecutors agree as 
part of plea bargains to recommend sentences at the top or bottom of ranges, 
while in other districts prosecutors do not.13 
The main U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. (Main Justice), 
periodically tries to regulate federal prosecutors by promulgating centralized 
policies. For example, a memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to 
federal prosecutors reiterated that prosecutors must usually charge and not 
bargain away the most serious, readily provable criminal charges.14 There is 
more centralized bureaucracy and oversight at the federal than the state level, 
which helps to keep far-flung federal offices in line. Each new President 
appoints the U.S. Attorney for each district, who is accountable to the Attorney 
General and is supposed to implement these Main Justice policies. While U.S. 
Attorneys typically come from the local bar, they are unelected and so cannot 
claim a mandate to implement idiosyncratic local priorities. Nevertheless, 
federal prosecutors are human beings, and their values, priorities, and tactics 
doubtless vary. Some have worked recently in Main Justice and are wedded to 
its mission,15 while others are far removed from Main Justice and its priorities. 
Indeed, one of the largest urban districts is known for its autonomy and 
resistance to Main Justice oversight.16 
Head prosecutors inevitably vary in their decisions about which crime 
problems to target. Some priorities come from Main Justice and Congress, but 
 
13. When I was a federal prosecutor, the practice of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York was not to plea bargain over the point within the range at 
which the judge should sentence the defendant. Federal prosecutors from other districts, such 
as the District of Columbia, have told me that in their districts plea bargains commonly 
stipulate to particular sentences within the ranges. See also Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael 
Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 
86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1122 (2001) (finding evidence that some drug-trafficking plea 
bargains stipulated to sentences at the tops of the applicable ranges). 
14. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft on Department Policy 
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, to All 
Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 129 (2003). 
15. Indeed, a few of the offices closest to Washington, D.C., (such as the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Alexandria branch of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia) routinely host Main Justice personnel 
who rotate in as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to gain trial experience. See Okianer 
Christian Dark, Transitioning from Law Teaching to Practice and Back Again: Proposals for 
Developing Lawyers Within the Law School Program, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 17, 19 (2003-2004) 
(explaining how the author served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney to gain trial 
experience after working in the Main Justice); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The 
Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 569 nn.*, ** (1998) (noting that both 
authors worked in the Main Justice and then as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the 
Eastern District of Virginia). 
16. Chitra Ragavan, The Pardon Buck Stops in New York: U.S. Attorney Mary Jo 
White Takes the Lead, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 2001, at 24 (stating that “because 
of its legendary independence and tenacity,” the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York “is known as the ‘sovereign district’ of New York”). 
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others bubble up in response to local crime problems. Head prosecutors 
inevitably allocate scarce resources in deciding which crimes to investigate and 
prosecute.17 
Line prosecutors vary greatly as well. Even though they are hired by a 
presidential appointee, Assistant U.S. Attorneys inevitably reflect the 
communities from which they come. U.S. Attorney’s Offices, moreover, vary 
greatly in their sizes, urbanness, and rates of turnover. To regulate larger and 
more transient workforces and ensure uniformity, large urban offices have 
more centralized policies and supervisory oversight.18 Each office has its own 
culture, charging and sentencing practices, and customary sentences for 
particular crimes.19 
Defense counsel are a third possible source of disparity. Some districts 
have aggressive, knowledgeable federal defenders’ offices that exploit and 
stretch every possible loophole in the Guidelines for their clients.20 Other 
districts have overburdened, less-aggressive, or less-experienced defense 
lawyers who know less about how to exploit the Guidelines.21 Because repeat 
players who pool information are best able to exploit these complexities, 
federal public defenders probably achieve lower sentences than private lawyers 
 
17. One could argue that prosecutor-initiated local variations are thus more justifiable 
and more inevitable than judge-initiated variations. Congress has the power to override these 
allocation decisions by funding prosecutor or agent positions dedicated to pursuing particular 
kinds of crime. It should, however, be reluctant to supersede superior local knowledge and 
so should refrain from earmarking particular positions for particular crimes. Also, in 
studying variations, Congress needs to separate out prosecutor-initiated downward 
departures from judge-initiated downward departures. To facilitate congressional oversight, 
prosecutors’ statistical reports should distinguish departures on prosecutors’ motions or with 
their agreement, departures that prosecutors neither support nor oppose, and departures that 
prosecutors actively oppose. Now that prosecutors initiate downward departures in more 
than one-fifth of all cases, Congress should scrutinize them carefully, instead of simply 
blaming the problem on judges. 
18. See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 117 (1978); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: 
A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 70-71 (1980). 
19. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 18, at 5-7.  
20. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical 
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 529-30 (1992) (quoting probation officers’ observations that in one 
district prosecutors are “outgunned” because of public defenders’ “commitment to the idea 
that knowledge [of the Guidelines] is power”). 
21. See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk 
of Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 435, 444-57 (2002) (explaining how the increasing complexity of federal sentencing 
law risks creating disparate outcomes based on the quality, experience, and funding of one’s 
defense lawyer); Bibas, supra note 2, at 2484 n.83 (providing other sources that substantiate 
and explore the disparity in the quality of defense counsel); Farabee, supra note 7, at 625 
(reporting judges’ comments that defense counsel in Massachusetts argue far less for 
departures than do Connecticut defense counsel, in part because Massachusetts lawyers are 
not well trained in Guidelines advocacy). 
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who take occasional ad hoc court appointments.22 Thus, districts that rely 
heavily on federal defenders’ offices may well have systematically lower 
sentences as a result. 
A fourth source of disparity is probation officers. Probation officers 
prepare presentence reports, which are supposed to allow judges to base 
sentences on defendants’ actual conduct. In some districts, probation officers 
simply summarize and digest whatever information prosecutors and agents give 
to them. In others, they conduct truly independent investigations.23 In some 
districts, probation officers apply the Guidelines strictly, while in others they 
are more willing to recommend departures.24 In some districts, judges rubber-
stamp the parties’ plea bargains and sentencing recommendations, even when 
they conflict with probation officers’ reports. In others, judges defer to 
probation officers’ versions of the facts and Guidelines computations, thwarting 
plea bargains that try to circumvent the Guidelines.25 Indeed, at least one 
district employs lawyers as probation officers; this arrangement may lead 
judges to give their recommendations more weight.26 
One might think that juries introduce local sentencing disparities. Today, 
however, plea bargains resolve ninety-five percent of adjudicated cases. And in 
the few jury trials, juries do not set sentences, do not know the sentencing 
consequences of their verdicts, and are instructed not to consider sentences.27 
Thus, juries play a negligible role in sentencing variation. 
II. A CASE STUDY OF UNJUSTIFIED VARIATION: FAST-TRACK PROGRAMS 
Each year, more than 900,000 people cross the Mexican-American border 
illegally into California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.28 Federal agents in 
these districts arrest far more illegal immigrants, alien smugglers, and drug 
traffickers than prosecutors could possibly bring to trial. Until the 1990s, 
federal prosecutors pursued a tiny fraction of the most serious offenders and 
 
22. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2534. 
23. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 200-02 (1991); see also Assessing the Probation Officers’ 
Survey: Does Fact Bargaining Undermine the Sentencing Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 
299, 305 (1996). 
24. Compare Farabee, supra note 7, at 604-07 (describing flexibility among probation 
officers in Connecticut ), with id. at 618-21 (describing Massachusetts probation officers as 
“true guardians of the Guidelines”). 
25. See Ulmer, supra note 10, at 264 tbl.1, 266-67. 
26. See id. at 266. 
27. Bowman & Heise, supra note 13, at 1182-83 & n.475. 
28. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2003 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 155 tbl.37 (2004) (reporting that Southwest Border 
Patrol offices located 905,065 deportable aliens in 2003), http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/ 
statistics/yearbook/2003/Table37.xls (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). Presumably there are even 
more illegal immigrants whom the Border Patrol does not succeed in locating. 
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declined to prosecute the rest. Most immigration-related cases in San Diego, for 
example, went unpunished because the San Diego District Attorney refused to 
prosecute cases related to the border.29 
In the last decade, federal prosecutors along the southwestern border 
established fast-track programs. While the details vary, these programs 
typically ask defendants to waive indictment, discovery, and presentence 
reports; plead guilty at the initial appearance; and consent to immediate 
sentencing. In return, prosecutors agree to recommend downward departures or 
let defendants plead to lesser charges. Because these cases move much more 
quickly, prosecutors can process many more of them.30 
Supporters defend these programs as necessary expedients to process huge 
numbers of cases. They view these charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing 
decisions as exercises of traditional prosecutorial discretion.31 The enormous 
caseloads along the border, they argue, are unique. By offering large sentence 
reductions, these districts can process many more cases, saving time and money 
and reducing court congestion.32 Processing more cases through truncated 
procedures also generates more deterrence and leaves fewer crimes unpunished. 
The effect is to reduce the hidden inequality of not punishing many crimes at 
all. Because border districts are deluged with illegal immigration and drug 
trafficking, they need drastic measures to stem the unique local harms that they 
suffer.33 Besides, by fully prosecuting only the worst offenders and offering 
fast-track deals to the rest, prosecutors tailor punishments to defendants’ 
culpability, softening unduly harsh sentences.34 In short, supporters claim that 
the Southwest’s large crime problem requires a different enforcement strategy. 
 
29. See William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 309-10 (1993). 
30. Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act: Hearing Before the U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, Sept. 23, 2003, at 11-12 (testimony of the Hon. Marilyn L. Huff, judge, 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California) [hereinafter Implementing the 
Requirements of the PROTECT Act]; id. at 74-79 (testimony of Paul K. Charlton, U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Arizona); see also Bersin & Feigin, supra note 12, at 301; 
Braniff, supra note 29, at 310-11 (noting that by charge-bargaining felonies down to 
misdemeanors, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California was able to 
handle 6000 more cases). 
31. Braniff, supra note 29, at 311; see also Implementing the Requirements of the 
PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 4 (testimony of the Hon. Marilyn L. Huff, judge, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California); id. at 48 (testimony of the Hon. 
Lourdes G. Baird, judge, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California). 
32. See Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 5-14 
(testimony of the Hon. Marilyn L. Huff, judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of California). 
33. See Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern 
District of California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 254 (1996); Bersin & Feigin, supra note 12, 
at 286-90; Braniff, supra note 29, at 309-11, 313. 
34. Bersin, supra note 33, at 256; see also Implementing the Requirements of the 
PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 19-22 (testimony of Steven Hubachek, Assistant Federal 
Public Defender for the Southern District of California). 
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True, southwestern districts do face an enormous volume of cases—a 
macro-level structural force that may require special treatment. But fast-track 
programs nonetheless qualify as unjustified variations, as they create 
significant, visible inequities. Institutionalized fast-track programs are far 
different from traditional, low-visibility, case-by-case prosecutorial discretion. 
They are different from rules of thumb that prosecutors use in secret triage to 
decide which cases to pursue with their limited resources. In essence, the 
border districts began engaging in wholesale legislative policymaking, 
supplanting Congress’s dominant role. 
Nor are these approaches inevitable. The Southern District of Florida 
processes its many immigration and drug-trafficking cases without a fast-track 
program and tries more cases than all five border districts combined.35 
Prosecutors can always claim that their huge workloads justify larger discounts, 
as there are always more cases than they can try. Though here the claim is 
strong, it sets a bad precedent,36 and there is precious little oversight or check 
on these claims. 
The result is inequality under a supposedly nationwide law that serves 
nationwide interests. The whole country, not just the Southwest, needs federal 
protection from drug smugglers, alien smugglers, and aggravated felons who 
reenter via the Southwest. Blatant inequality serves as a precedent for 
nonborder districts and tempts other courts to lower their sentences to match.37 
The result is a patchwork of inequality that subverts nominal sentences set by 
Congress and the Sentencing Commission. And in the process, fast-track 
programs bypass most procedural safeguards, truncating plea bargaining even 
more and increasing the risk of convicting the innocent.38 These districts 
 
35. See Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 108-
09, 118-19 (testimony of Frank O. Bowman, law professor and former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Southern District of Florida) (“This gaping chasm between what might be done [to 
process cases along the border] and what is now done cries out, I think, for some 
explanation. Why aren’t the border districts trying hundreds of cases every year and using 
the threat of trials to force guidelines compliance?”). 
36. Indeed, many districts that are not along the border have followed the Southwest’s 
lead. Now, up to half of judicial districts have some form of fast-track program. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 5, at 64; see also United States 
v. Perez-Chavez, No. 2:05-CR-00003PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *44 app. A (D. 
Utah May 16, 2005) (reporting that many districts that do not adjoin the Mexican-American 
border have fast-track programs, including the Northern District of California; the Northern 
District of Georgia; the Districts of Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Oregon; and the 
Western District of Washington). 
37. United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (E.D. Va. 2005); 
Sentencing Memorandum at 8-10, United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958 
(E.D. Wis. 2005); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 5, at 67; 
Erin T. Middleton, Note, Fast-Track to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing Policies Along 
the Southwest Border Are Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal 
Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827, 848-50 (advocating downward departures to equalize 
sentences and avoid equal protection violations). 
38. See Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 52-56 
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should bring their chronic enforcement problems out into the open and let 
Congress decide whether to allocate more money, rather than concealing the 
problems with idiosyncratic strategies.39 
Congress regulated ad hoc fast-track programs in § 401(m)(2)(B) of the 
PROTECT Act. That provision directed the Sentencing Commission to issue a 
policy statement authorizing fast-track downward departures of up to four 
levels. For a defendant to receive the departure, the Attorney General and U.S. 
Attorney must authorize an early disposition program, and the prosecutor must 
move for the departure.40 
In other words, Congress struck a compromise. On the one hand, it 
legitimated the various ad hoc programs that had been proceeding without 
formal approval. On the other hand, it regulated them procedurally (by 
requiring high-level approval) and substantively (by capping the departure at 
four levels). The regulation adds democratic legitimacy to prosecutors’ 
unauthorized policymaking and strategic choices. It also limits the size of the 
disparity in each case. And yet, by bringing these reductions out into the open 
and sanctioning them, the compromise openly enshrines unwarranted local 
disparities.41 This blatant, pragmatic, ad hoc acceptance of local disparities 
may pave the way for further local and regional variations. By openly allowing 
some disparities and attacking others, Congress risks appearing hypocritical. 
Instead, Congress should abolish or clamp down on this unjustified 
variation to reduce inequality as far as possible. If Congress simply cannot 
abolish these programs, at the very least it should limit the regions, crimes, and 
numbers of persons covered by them. There is no excuse for letting these ad 
hoc programs proliferate beyond their raison d’être—southwestern illegal 
immigrants and low-level drug couriers. 
III. A MIXED BAG: SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES 
A. How Substantial Assistance Works in Practice 
A second case study involves variation that is attributable not to local 
crime problems, but to local customs and habits. Prosecutors have long struck 
deals with informants and cooperating witnesses. Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines § 5K1.1 formalizes and cabins this venerable practice by 
 
(testimony of Maria E. Stratton, Federal Public Defender for the Central District of 
California). 
39. See id. at 106-11 (testimony of Frank O. Bowman, III, law professor and former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida). 
40. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (2003); see U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2004) (implementing this statutory provision). 
41. See Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act, supra note 30, at 99-101 
(testimony of Frank O. Bowman, III, law professor and former Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
Southern District of Florida). 
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authorizing downward departures for cooperating defendants. To earn the 
departure, a defendant must provide assistance that is substantial in the 
investigation or prosecution of others. In addition, the prosecution must file a 
motion, commonly called a “5K1 letter,” certifying that the cooperator 
provided substantial assistance. Finally, the judge must find that, in fact, the 
defendant provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
others. The judge’s findings unlock the Guidelines, allowing the judge to depart 
below the otherwise applicable sentencing range. Section 5K1.1 does not 
specify what percentage or how many months’ reduction the judge should 
award.42 Section 5K1.1 is controversial to begin with. It treats some defendants 
much more leniently than others based not on their just deserts, but on their 
ability to help catch and convict others. The resulting inequality of sentences is 
a necessary evil because it gives some culpable defendants less punishment 
than they deserve in order to catch other defendants. 
Compounding this inherent inequity is another cluster of inequities: 
prosecutors and judges vary widely in how they implement the provision. First, 
districts vary greatly in the raw percentages of defendants who earn substantial 
assistance departures. In some districts, fewer than four percent receive them, 
while in others the rate is forty percent or more.43 
Second, prosecutors’ offices vary in defining what conduct qualifies for a 
substantial assistance departure. For example, in some districts cooperators 
must take part in undercover activity, while in others they can earn departures 
simply by providing marginally useful information.44 Offices are almost evenly 
divided on whether a defendant can qualify simply by providing information 
about his own crimes.45 
Third, districts vary greatly in the size or extent of departures that they 
award. In some districts, cooperators routinely earn discounts of one-third to 
one-half off the otherwise applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. In others, 
most cooperators earn discounts of two or three levels, which reduce the 
applicable range by roughly twenty-five to thirty-five percent.46 In some 
 
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004). 
43. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 53-55 & tbl.26. 
44. See Ulmer, supra note 10, at 263-65 & tbl.1 (reporting that in the pseudonymous 
Northeast District defendants received departures even if they “provided information of 
questionable value,” while in the Western District “‘you have to put yourself in jeopardy. 
Take a risk. Wear a wire, buy drugs, something like that’” (quoting an experienced 
prosecutor)). 
45. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN 
EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 9, 26 
exhb.4 (1998), http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2005); 
Stanley Marcus, Substantial Assistance Motions: What Is Really Happening?, 6 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 6, 6-8 (1993). This disagreement is surprising, as the text of § 5K1.1 appears to require 
substantial assistance against others, not just against oneself. 
46. See Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures: 
Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 41, 43-44 (1999); Ulmer, supra 
note 10, at 263-65 & tbl.1; see also Bibas, supra note 2, at 2488 & n.100 (citing a source for 
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districts, prosecutors recommend specific sentences for cooperators, while in 
about one-third of federal districts they do not.47 These recommendations serve 
as mental anchors or benchmarks and so greatly influence actual sentences.48 
Districts also vary because judges in some districts resent what they view 
as unduly severe Guidelines sentences. These judges are happy to exploit 
substantial assistance departures to escape the Guidelines’ strictures.49 Other 
judges, however, seek to peg their departures to the Guidelines, offering 
proportionate and more modest discounts. Likewise, districts vary in how they 
write and approve 5K1 letters. In some, an individual supervisor or a committee 
reviews and approves letters before line prosecutors may file them. In others, 
line prosecutors have freer rein.50 The latter approach allows more room for 
individual prosecutors’ senses of justice to influence sentences. In particular, 
line prosecutors often come to sympathize with their cooperators and thus seek 
or acquiesce in lower sentences, instead of minimizing the sentence discount 
paid for information.51 
Fourth, districts vary in reviewing line assistants’ substantial assistance 
recommendations. Many districts have no written review policies, and even 
those that do are often inconsistent in enforcing these policies.52 
Fifth, districts vary in their reasons for offering cooperation discounts. 
Most obviously, districts use the discounts to gain assistance in successfully 
prosecuting cases that they otherwise could not pursue. Large cooperation 
discounts can induce gang members, who would otherwise remain silent out of 
fear and loyalty, to flip and cooperate against gang leaders.53 Thus, large urban 
districts that prosecute many complex, multi-defendant cases may need to use 
cooperation discounts more often than districts that handle smaller cases. Less 
obviously, prosecutors who are risk averse or too lazy to find evidence in other 
ways may overbuy cooperation. By doing so, they shore up cases that were 
probably winnable with fewer or no cooperators.54 In some districts, 
 
the proposition that a three-level discount is on average a thirty-five percent reduction in the 
severity of the sentence). 
47. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 45, at 33 exhb.11, 34 exhb.12. 
48. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2518-19. 
49. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 294 (1996); Jack B. 
Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 12 (1992). 
50. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 45, at 7-8, 25 exhb.3; Richman, supra note 
49, at 292. 
51. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 531-32; Richman, supra note 49, at 292; 
see also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 944 (1999) (quoting a former federal 
prosecutor about the danger of “falling in love with your rat”). 
52. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 45, at 24 exhb.2, 25 exhb.3. 
53. See Safer & Crowl, supra note 46, at 42, 44. 
54. See Richman, supra note 49, at 293. 
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prosecutors go even further, using cooperation discounts simply as plea 
bargaining tools to mitigate seemingly harsh sentences. This desire explains 
why, in at least one district, the fig leaf of almost any information suffices to 
earn a 5K1 letter.55 There is even evidence that conscious or unconscious bias 
may be entering the system. On average, men, blacks, Hispanics, noncitizens, 
and high-school dropouts receive fewer and smaller 5K1 departures than 
women, nonminorities, citizens, and high school graduates.56 
B. How To Achieve the Right Blend of Uniformity 
What is the right blend of uniformity and local variation in awarding 
substantial assistance departures? As a rule, line prosecutors have the best 
insight into their cases, their own need for cooperation, and the likely fruits of 
that cooperation. They have lived with their cases the longest and have a feel 
for the factual nuances and cooperators’ truthfulness and value.57 The criminal 
justice system trusts prosecutorial discretion and judgment, in part because no 
rule can substitute for it. 
Yet, even though prosecutorial discretion is necessary and useful, it should 
not be unfettered or arbitrary. Procedural and substantive regulations can help 
to channel, guide, and equalize cooperation-related decisions. By doing so, 
these regulations can counteract prosecutors’ self-interest in disposing of cases 
quickly. The remainder of this section sketches out a few procedural and 
substantive suggestions for increasing national uniformity while preserving 
appropriate local discretion. 
Procedural mechanisms: Supervisory prosecutors are well placed to 
regulate line prosecutors’ behavior. U.S. Attorneys are accountable to Main 
Justice and to the President who appointed them, and they and their deputies 
can supervise substantial assistance decisions. Main Justice could promulgate 
written policies detailing the types of supervision and approval that U.S. 
Attorneys and division and unit chiefs should exercise over line prosecutors. 
Line prosecutors should be required to write up reports summarizing and 
justifying each case, its evidentiary holes, the need for cooperating witnesses, 
each cooperator’s background, and the anticipated payoff from cooperation. 
These reports would go to office-wide committees, which would read each 
report, ask questions, and compare each case to others.58 The committee would 
 
55. See Ulmer, supra note 10, at 263-65 & tbl.1 (reporting that the pseudonymous 
Northeast District routinely awards “soft 5K1s” in exchange for “information of 
questionable value” because, according to defense attorneys, all the parties want to soften 
Guidelines sentences that seem too harsh); see also Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for 
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 613-15 (1999). 
56. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 45, at 31 exhb.9, 34 exhb.12. 
57. See Richman, supra note 49, at 294. 
58. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2541-42; see also Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-66 (2002) (describing a system of 
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apply standardized criteria set forth in the Main Justice policy to ensure greater 
uniformity across districts. This process would vet both cooperation agreements 
early on in a case and 5K1 letters shortly before sentencing. 
Procedural review could check excessive cooperation in several ways. 
First, the documentation and approval requirements would restrict the 
frequency of cooperation agreements and ensure some threshold showing of 
prosecutorial need. Likewise, procedural review might veto some 5K1 letters or 
restrict recommended discounts for cooperation that is only marginally useful. 
Second, Main Justice and congressional subcommittees could conduct periodic 
oversight of prosecutors’ written cooperation reports. They might particularly 
scrutinize districts whose 5K1 rates or discount sizes well exceed the norm. 
Some large urban districts could justify their high rates by showing that their 
many complex, multi-defendant cases require cooperators; their particular local 
crime problems may justify a measure of variation. Third, to combat exorbitant 
cooperation rates in excess of forty percent in some districts, Congress or Main 
Justice could consider rationing. One possible way to ration would be to 
mandate that no more than fifteen percent of defendants in each district receive 
cooperation agreements; the cap for large urban districts might be higher. The 
office-wide review committees would then decide which proposed agreements 
are most meritorious.59 It would not be easy to set the right amount of 
rationing, and Congress and Main Justice would probably err on the side of 
allowing generosity. Nevertheless, some form of rationing could force 
prosecutors to rank priorities and buy cooperation where they need it most. 
Substantive review: Congress, Main Justice, and the Sentencing 
Commission could also adopt substantive policies to ensure more consistent 
outcomes across districts. First, they could categorize the types of assistance 
that qualify as substantial, much as death penalty analysis groups cases by 
aggravating and mitigating factors.60 Typologies would build on descriptive 
evidence of existing consensuses among prosecutors’ offices. They would also 
harmonize outliers and propose prescriptive criteria tied to the importance of 
particular forms of assistance. 
For example, the Sentencing Commission’s own data indicate a consensus 
that participating in an undercover investigation or testifying truthfully is 
 
supervisory control and review that successfully restricted plea bargaining in the New 
Orleans District Attorney’s Office). This process could be modeled on (though more 
streamlined than) the Department of Justice’s Capital Case Review Committee process. See 
generally Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 406-29 (1999). Committees 
would need some flexibility to expedite review of cooperation agreements in cases where 
time is of the essence. 
59. Weinstein, supra note 55, at 630-31 (advancing this proposal). 
60. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the 
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska 
Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 557-60 & figs.5-6 (2002). 
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substantial assistance.61 In contrast, a slight majority of offices treat providing 
self-incriminating information as not even relevant to, let alone sufficient for, a 
5K1 motion.62 The use of self-incrimination also seems to conflict with the text 
of § 5K1.1. Accordingly, new guidelines could forbid 5K1 reductions for 
providing self-incriminating evidence, but encourage reductions in exchange 
for truthful testimony and undercover work. Standing ready to testify or 
providing investigative leads earns a 5K1 letter between 27.9% and 47.6% of 
the time.63 Congress could direct the Sentencing Commission to establish 
criteria for deciding which of these cases merit 5K1 letters. For example, 5K1 
letters could be available only where the other available evidence is inadequate 
to convict a codefendant and the offense level for other crimes prosecuted 
exceeds some threshold. 
Second, Main Justice should adopt national policies on whether 
prosecutors should recommend particular discounts and, if so, the appropriate 
range for those discounts. Congress could direct the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to adopt policy statements to guide judges’ substantial assistance 
departures and facilitate appellate review. Once again, the policies could build 
upon Sentencing Commission data describing existing patterns and forms of 
assistance but also harmonize outliers and build in prescriptive criteria. For 
example, courts generally reduce cooperators’ sentences by a certain 
percentage instead of tying discounts to the offenses of conviction.64 Courts 
calibrate the percentage discounts to the kind of assistance offered: testimony at 
trial or before a grand jury typically earns the largest discounts, followed by 
undercover work, providing tangible evidence, providing verbal information, 
and lastly merely agreeing to testify.65 This ranking makes sense; the greater 
risks and payoffs of undercover operations and public testimony justify greater 
rewards. New policy statements could instruct prosecutors to weigh these and 
other factors, such as the number of other defendants investigated, prosecuted, 
and convicted, and the offense levels of those defendants. 
These policies can only set benchmarks or norms, because cases vary too 
much for hard rules to fit. Discounts need to fit the degree of danger, degree of 
effort, and value of the cooperation, and one cannot precisely codify these 
factors. However, the U.S. Sentencing Commission can harmonize districts’ 
practices by codifying the lessons that it has learned over the last two 
decades.66 Congress should not simply write these criteria itself, short-
circuiting the Commission’s expertise. Congress should instead direct the 
Commission to reduce, regulate, and harmonize substantial assistance 
 
61. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 45, at 27 exhb.5. 
62. Id. at 25 exhb.3. 
63. Id. at 27 exhb.5 (analyzing a sample of 264 drug-conspiracy members). 
64. See id. at 18. 
65. See id. at 32 exhb.10. 
66. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.4(b) (2004) (envisioning 
eventual codification of the accretion of common law wisdom). 
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departures, much as Congress has already done with other downward 
departures. 
CONCLUSION 
Persistent, blatant regional and local variations require regulation lest they 
undercut equality, deterrence, and respect for national law. The key is to sort 
out justified and unjustified types of variation. Policies, values, and probably 
strategies should be uniform at the national level, and local hostility to the 
Guidelines should not be an excuse for variation. Nevertheless, locales need 
freedom to experiment with tactics and respond to crime waves. The law 
should also promote equality by regulating all actors and sources of sentencing 
disparity, not just judges. Main Justice should, for example, try to harmonize 
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining. Congress should direct the 
Sentencing Commission to promulgate uniform procedures and substantive 
criteria in order to harmonize substantial assistance requirements among far-
flung districts. Only by supervising and regulating both prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion can we reduce undesirable local variation while allowing 
desirable variation to flourish. 
